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1 Introduction
That the rules of an auction mechanism are not altered - and that the bidders
trust this being the case - is a central prerequisite for the mechanism to work
properly. For the seller, who is usually in the position of designing the mechanism,
this requires a variety of commitments regarding communication, allocation, and
payment processes. Commitment is especially important for the seller since, as
demonstrated by McAdams and Schwarz (2007a,b), it is typically she who bears
the costs associated with rule-breaking; forward looking buyers anticipate any ex
post redesign of the mechanism, and adjust their play accordingly at the interim
stage. This commitment problem can be seen as the reason for the markets for
intermediaries. Their business is to help the seller commit to the rules of the game.
But in anonymous platforms like the Internet, intermediaries or third parties
may only have limited capacity to prevent parties from violating the rules of the
game. And there are many ways to bend them. For example, the seller may cast
shill bids or the buyers may shade their bids, there may be ex post bargaining
over the good, etc. (see Boyd and Mayo, 2000).1 The most obvious way for the
seller to change the rules is not to honor the mechanism once it has been played
and the outcome has been determined. Instead, she may reauction the good via
another mechanism.
The job of online auctions such as eBay, u-Bid, or Amazon is to determine
the winner and the price of the auction on the basis of bids, i.e. to serve as an
infomediary - a device through which communication takes place.2 However, as
the above discussion suggests, they cannot enforce the trade.3 From the theoretical
point of view this is a problem since the seller does have an incentive to reauction
the good via another mechanism after the mechanism has been run, in order to
extract further surplus from the winner. A curious fact is that this appears to
happen very rarely.4 We argue that the reason why the online auctions can be
credibly committed to is the way information is being processed within them.5
We study auction mechanisms that can be implemented when the seller can
change the rules of the game by reauctioning the good once the auction mecha-
nism has been executed but before the physical transaction has taken place. No
restrictions are put on how many times the good can be reauctioned nor what
the structure of a new auction mechanism may be. Also the buyers can leave the
game whenever they want. We show that the way online auctions are designed
can be seen as a rational response to the commitment problem - it allows parties
1For an extensive literature on shill bidding, see Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou (2004),
McAdams and Schwarz (2007b), or Izmalkov (2005), and references therein.
2For surveys, see Lucking-Reiley (2000a) and Ockenfels et al (2007).
3For example, eBay is explicit in not taking measures against a seller who refuses to honor
the transaction (see http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/report-trading.html).
4According to eBay, less than 1% of auctions are led for fraudulent behavior (see also Adams,
2005). Vast majority of led cases concern the failure to transfer the merchandise or the payment,
or the misrepresentation of the quality of the good. In fact, refusal to honor the terms of trade
(or equivalent) is not even represented in the Federal Trade Commissions classication of online
auction frauds (see http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/tech/tec07.shtm.
5I am indebted to a referee who suggested this interpretetation.
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to commit credibly to the original mechanism.
The most common online auction mechanism is the ascending English auction
or its versions (by Lucking-Reiley, 2000a, they cover almost 90% of the online
auctions). The popularity of the English auction is striking since it is not, in
general, among the most protable auction mechanisms (Myerson, 1981).6 The
variant that almost all the auction sites (including the aforementioned ones) en-
courage the sellers to use is the one where bidders post a condential proxy or
maximum bid and the winning bidder (bidder with the highest proxy bid) pays
the price of the second-highest bid. This implementation of the English auction
reduces bidding costs as the bidders do not have to stay online during the time the
auction runs. From the viewpoint of the bidders, the proxy ascending auction is
equivalent to the second price (Vickrey) auction as they cast a single bid and the
winner pays the second highest bid. However, from the viewpoint of the seller the
two mechanisms di¤er as the proxy ascending auction does not reveal the value
of the winning bid. The only publicly revealed pieces of information are (i) the
identity of the winner, (ii) the value of the second highest bid.7
We shall argue that for the seller to be able to commit to the mechanism, it
is crucial that the auction mechanism does not reveal too much information. Our
main result is that, in the absence of commitment, the only mechanism that can
be credibly implemented is the English auction, or one of its versions (e.g., the
proxy bidding mechanism).
An eloquent example of why too much information may render an auction
mechanism unworkable can be found in Lucking-Reiley (2000b). He describes how
the operation of the Vickrey auction by a stamp auctioneer becomes jeopardized
as the auctioneer is not able to commit to the rules of the game. Once the value
of the highest bid is known, the seller faces an irresistible temptation to raise
the price by pretending that another bid was received just under the maximum
amount. Of course, knowing this, the bidders are reluctant to reveal their true
willingness to pay.8
Note that the English auction would not have been subject to the same con-
cerns since it would only have revealed the second highest bid to the stamp auc-
tioneer. To understand why the English auction can be committed to, a little
more machinery is needed.
To model the idea that the parties do not have commitment power, we as-
sume that there are no physical costs of changing the rules of the game, and that
the rules can be changed any number of times. To operationalize this idea, we
decompose a mechanism into two parts, an information processing device and an
implementation device. The information processing device can be interpreted as
a trusted infomediary like an online auction site. Its role is to transform reliably
the buyersmessages to an output - a public signal. For example, in the rst price
auction the prole of bids serves as the public signal. No technological constraints
are imposed on the form of the information processing device. The task of the
6However, the English auction may be optimal in a restricted class of mechanisms, see e.g.
Milgrom and Weber (1982) or Lopomo (1998, 2001).
7Many auction sites, including eBay, also make the other losing bids publicly veriable.
8See Rothkopf et al. (1990) for a similar argument.
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implementation device is to implement a physical outcome contingent on the sig-
nal or "recommendation" generated by the information processing device. In the
context of the rst price auction, the task of the implementation device is to sell
the good to the highest bidder with the price of his bid.
The key assumption we make is that neither the bidders nor the seller can
commit to the implementation device. That is, ex post, after the information
processing device has done its job and the signal has been produced, the seller
can turn to another (composite) mechanism rather than implement the outcome
suggested by the implementation device. The bidders are always free to choose an
outside option rather than accept the outcome of the implementation device.
Our aim is to characterize mechanisms that the seller does not want to re-
design, i.e. mechanisms, whose implementation device the seller wants to obey.
To this end, we capture the sellers mechanism selection behavior by a rule  that
identies, for each probability distribution p over the buyersvaluations; a mech-
anism [p] that the seller chooses to implement under the belief p. The rule 
species the dynamics of the play by specifying how the changing beliefs a¤ect
the sellers behavior.
Incentive compatibility requires that the seller can commit to implement [p]
under belief p: Two conditions are imposed on  that guarantee that a sequentially
rational seller can indeed do this. The rst is that the rule has to be internally
consistent : selecting [p] should not be in conict with obeying  later when
information is generated within [p] and p is updated accordingly. The second
condition is that the rule must be optimal : under any belief p the seller should
not be able to prot by implementing some other incentive feasible mechanism
than [p] in the class of mechanisms that she can commit to, given that she obeys
 in the future when p is a¤ected.9 The latter property is dubbed as the one-
deviation property. A stationarity condition, which requires that the rule is not
conditioned on payo¤ irrelevant information, is also assumed.10
It should be emphasized that the methods developed in this work do not at-
tempt to challenge or provide an alternative for the standard equilibrium tech-
niques. Rather, the modeling here is meant to be consistent with them. The
motivation for the reduced form modeling approach is expositional. Cleaning
away the details of the extensive form makes the model simple and transparent,
and allows us to focus on the aspects of strategic interaction that are central.
Our main result is that the payo¤ and information structure of any feasible
mechanism, i.e., a mechanism chosen by a mechanism selection rule that meets
consistency, the one-deviation property, and stationarity is a version of the English
9Incentive feasibility here requires that the mechanism is incentive compatible and also guar-
antees the bidders their outside option payo¤ under non-truthful messages. This property, which
is called veto-incentive compatibility, is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the bidders to
play the game honestly if they can walk away at any stage of the game.
10Stationarity, which is important for the uniqueness result, can be dened in many ways. The
key aspect of any denition is that the sellers behavior should not be dependent on unnecessary
details. This could be motivated by a a desire to avoid computational burden: if the seller
has been programmed to implement a mechanism under current belief, and an extra piece of
information does not allow her to implement any more protable mechanism, then her choice
remains unchanged.
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auction (indexed by a tie-breaking rule). Conversely, the rule that always chooses
a version of the English auction is consistent, stationary, and meets the one-
deviation property. Thus the English auction or its versions are essentially the
only mechanisms that the seller can credibly implement without commitment.11
Our argument is closely related to the famous Coase conjecture which says that
in the one buyer scenario the seller without commitment power is forced to sell
the good with the price equal to the least possible valuation of the buyer (see Gul
et al., 1986; Fudenberg et al., 1985, Ausubel et al., 2002). The English auction
is robust against commitment problems for an analogous reason. The English
auction reveals (i) the buyer with the highest valuation (the winner), and (ii) the
valuations of all but the winner. Since the winner is known to have the highest
valuation once the output has materialized, the seller cannot commit to sell the
good to anyone but the winner with the price equal to the lower bound of his
possible valuations, i.e., the second highest valuation. Hence, as the seller cannot
commit to change the English auction, she can commit to implementing it. But
this implies that the seller cannot commit to any action that could be improved ex
post by running the English auction after the outcome has been determined. We
show that this constraint is actually very severe: only the English auction itself
satises it.12
An important limitation of our model is that, since the signals of the infor-
mation processing device are public, private communication between the bidders
and the seller is ruled out, i.e. the case where the information processing device
generates di¤erent signals to the seller and the bidders (Skreta 2010 is, to our
knowledge, the only paper in the literature that allows private communication).
There are three justications for this assumption. Firstly, online auctions in the
real world explicitly ban all private communication between the seller and indi-
vidual buyers. Secondly, the assumption allows us to avoid the vexed problem of
mechanism design under an informed principal. Thirdly, as private communication
is likely to make commitment more di¢ cult to achieve (more detailed information
than necessary of the buyerswillingness to pay increases the protability of the
redesign), the seller would rather employ an intermediary that prevents private
signals since the costs from such activity tend to be borne by the seller, as demon-
strated by McAdams and Schwarz (2007a,b). They show, in particular, that when
the seller employing the rst price auction cannot commit not to take further of-
fers, trade may eventually take place after a long delay and with substantial delay
cost. Importantly, when the delay cost is low, the resulting mechanism closely
resembles the English auction. This is consistent with our model which predicts
that only the English auction can be committed to.
Relatedly, it is important that the seller can commit to the information process-
ing device or, equivalently, that the infomediary can commit not to leak informa-
tion to the seller. As McAdams and Schwarz (2007a,b) argue, this commitment
ability can be motivated by the idea that, since the intermediary does not own the
11"Essentially" here means that the auction may also reveal some immaterial information.
12For studies on the no-gap case in the durable good monopoly scenario, see Ausubel and
Deneckere (1989a,b)
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object, he should have weak marginal incentives to get a higher price. Moreover,
since intermediaries are typically long run players in the market, reputational con-
cerns are more likely to provide them with strong enough incentives not to break
the commitment.
Commitment to the information processing device is not a problem when the
mechanism can be interpreted as a cheap talk game which does not require private
information processing. For example, the English auction can be implemented via
cheap talk. See Krishna (2007), and the references therein, for conditions where
this is possible.
This work adds to the literature on mechanism design without commitment by
developing a conceptual framework in which commitment to mechanisms can be
analyzed in a reduced form, without making detailed assumptions concerning the
extensive form game. This simplies the analysis greatly, and allows us to circum-
vent the need to restrict the way the mechanism can be designed or redesigned
(apart from allowing private communication between the seller and the bidders).13
McAfee and Vincent (1997) study a more structured set up where the seller
can set a positive reserve price but cannot commit to not re-auctioning the good
if the current bids do not exceed the reserve price. Assuming a xed auction
mechanism, they demonstrate that as the lag before potential re-auction becomes
short, the sequentially optimal (given re-auctioning) reserve-price produces the
same expected revenue as an auction with a reserve price equal to the sellers
valuation of the good.
Bester and Strausz (2001) and Skreta (2006) study commitment in the single-
agent case where the designer can use a general communication device to extract
information from the agent. However, the number of rounds is bounded (two
in the case of Bester and Strausz 2001), which allows the problem to be solved
backwards. The result found by Bester and Strausz (2001) is that in the one
buyer case the best mechanism is still direct (however, Bester and Strausz, 2000,
show that with more than one agent this no longer holds). But, as opposed to the
revelation principle, contracts are no longer fully revealing since, in equilibrium,
the agent randomizes. Skreta (2006) shows that in a multi-stage bargaining game
it is still optimal for the seller to post prices in each period rather than extract
information via some complicated mechanism.
Skreta (2010) develops techniques for analyzing multi-agent mechanism design
problems without commitment. In her framework, the seller can re-auction the
good if it has not been previously sold. Unlike in McAfee and Vincent (1997), the
seller may now employ any mechanism to do this. There are two key aspects which
make Skreta (2010) and this paper quite di¤erent. First, Skreta (2010) focuses
on cases in which the number of redesign rounds is bounded (one in most of the
paper). Due to discounting, the basic tradeo¤ is between selling fast and reaching
the nal period, in which the seller can commit to the optimal mechanism. In our
framework, where there is no cost of redesigning the mechanism, Skretas (2010)
problem would be vacuous as the seller would choose a null mechanism in all
13Calzolari and Pavan (2006b) study the alternative case: optimal information revelation along
the contracting process when the principals commitment is perfect.
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but the last period and then implement the optimal one. The second and more
important di¤erence is that Skreta (2010) allows private communication, which is
a major complication. The main result of the paper is that despite the possibility
of private communication, an optimal mechanism is simple and only uses public
communication.
The problem of redesign is also akin to the literature on resale in auctions.
Much of the focus in this literature has been on identifying the optimal auction
with resale.14 However, this literature is fundamentally di¤erent from the current
approach in that once a good is sold, the buyer who obtains the good - and
becomes the new seller - is privately informed about his willingness to sell the good.
This, in general, jeopardizes e¢ ciency in the after market (due to Myerson and
Satterthwaite, 1983). Thus the problem no longer has the recursive structure that
drives the analysis of this paper; that the design problem and redesign problem are
conceptually similar and that they should be solved by using the same principles.
Further connections to the literature are discussed in the nal section.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 species the set-up and the game.
Section 3 denes the solution. The results are stated in Section 4. Sections 5 and
6 conclude with discussion on the solution concept.
2 Set up
There is a seller of a single indivisible good and a set N = f1; :::; ng of buyers.
Sellers publicly known valuation of the good is 0. Buyer is privately known
valuation i is drawn from a discrete seti  R+:Write = i2Ni with a typical
element  = (i)i2N , and  i = j 6=ii with a typical element  i = (j)j 6=i.15
Denote by () the set of probability distributions p over ; and by pi the ith
marginal distribution of p:16
The set of allocations of the good is A = f(a1; :::; an) 2 f0; 1gn : a1 + :::+ an 
1g; where ai = 1 if the good is allocated to i and ai = 0 otherwise. Write
a = (a1; :::; an): A money transfer from buyer i to the seller is denoted by mi 2 R+
and m = (m1; :::;mn) is a prole of transfers: The set of all outcomes x = (a;m)
is then X = A Rn+:
Now we dene amechanism. Amechanism does two things: processes informa-
tion and implements an outcome. We separate these tasks. Denote by (X) the
set of probability distributions over X: A mechanism  is a composite function
 = g  h : ! (X);
consisting of an information processing device h and an implementation device g
such that
h : ! (S) and g : S ! X;
14See Zheng (2002), Calzolari and Pavan (2006a), Garratt and Troger (2006), or Hafalir and
Krishna (2008).
15That is, pi(i) =
P
 i p(i;  i):
16Hence countable and without accumulation points. This assumption is for technical simplic-
ity.
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where (S) is the set of probability distributions over S; an open subset of an
Euclidean space: That is, the information processing device h generates, after
receiving the buyersmessages, a public signal s 2 S: The signal s is the only
information anyone - including the seller - obtains from h. The outcome function
g then implements an outcome x 2 X conditional on the realized signal s: That
the implementation device is deterministic reects the idea that the seller cannot
make partial commitment, e.g. in the probabilistic sense, to implement an outcome
before it is actually implemented.
Letting H = fh :  ! (S)g and G = fg : S ! Xg denote the sets of
information processing devices and implementation devices, respectively, the set
of all composite mechanisms is
 = fg  h : ! (X) such that g 2 G and h 2 Hg:
The support of distribution p is denoted by supp(p): Also write h() = fs :
h(s : ) > 0g and h(supp(p)) = fs : h(s : ) > 0 and  2supp(p)g: Given p, a
signal s 2 h(supp(p)) of the information processing device h induces a posterior
p( : s; h) = p()h (s : ) =
P
2 p()h (s : ) : To economize on notation, write
p( : s; h) = p(s; h). Since the signals are public, p(s; h) 2 () for all s 2
h(supp(p)): By the denition of the support, supp(p(s; h)) supp(p) for all h and
for all s:
The mechanism g h is constant under p if h(supp(p)) is singleton. A constant
mechanism implementing outcome x is denoted by
1x 2 :
A constant mechanism does not a¤ect the beliefs and implements the same out-
come with probability one. The two mechanisms (g  h) and (g0  h0) are out-
come equivalent under p if they induce the same outcome function: (g  h)() =
(g0  h0)(); for all  2supp(p): Finally, if the information provided by the mech-
anism g  h is not ner than what is necessary to implement the outcome. That
is, if g(s) = g(s0) implies s = s0 for all s; s0 2 h(supp(p)), then we may write
p(s; h) = p(g(s); g  h):
Buyer is and the sellers payo¤s from the allocation x = (a;m) are, respec-
tively,
ui(a;m; i) = iai  mi;
v(a;m) =
P
i2N
mi:
Abusing the notation slightly, we may denote the payo¤s of buyer i and the seller
from the allocation x = (a;m) by ui(x; i) and v(x); respectively:
3 Solution
The sellers problem is that she cannot commit to the implementation device g once
the signal s has been produced by the information processing device h. Rather,
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she may be tempted to design a new mechanism under her post-signal belief. In
this section, we identify conditions that the mechanism needs to satisfy for the
seller to credibly commit to it.
What makes the problem challenging is that we cannot employ backwards
induction or a related structure since there is no nal stage from which to start
the recursion. That is, for any past history of redesigned mechanisms, there still
exists a chance to redesign the current mechanism. That is why the solution has
to be based on a "xed point" argument.
In other words, whether the seller can commit to a mechanism depends on
what mechanisms are available to her ex post, given the post-signal beliefs. But
since ex post she can only select from mechanisms that she can commit to - the
same question she faced at the ex ante stage - the mechanisms that the seller can
commit to need to be identied for all beliefs simultaneously. At the same time,
consistency across ex ante and ex post beliefs and the sellers incentives must be
honoured.
We solve the mechanisms that can be committed to in two nested parts. First
we specify conditions under which, by the revelation principle, the buyers could
commit to a direct mechanism. Then we identify conditions under which the
seller can commit to a direct mechanism given that the buyers can. This requires
dening which mechanism the seller would implement under di¤erent (posterior)
beliefs, if they were to materialize at the ex post stage of a mechanism. Otherwise
one cannot guarantee that the seller can commit to the mechanism in the rst
place.
Buyersincentives We assume that the buyers can exit any point of the
game. Thus any implementable mechanism g  h must be ex post individually
rational (EXP-IR):17
ui(g(s); i)  0; for all s 2 h(); for all  2 supp(p); for all i 2 N:
Given p; buyer is interim payo¤ from a mechanism g  h isP
 i
P
s
p ()ui(g(s); i)h (s : ) :
By the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979), an implementable mechanism must
be incentive compatible. A mechanism g  h is incentive compatible (IC) ifP
 i
P
s
p ()ui(g(s); i) [h (s : )  h (s :  i; 0i)]  0; for all i; 0i 2 i; for all i 2 N;
However, incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality are not inde-
pendent conditions: The right of veto might be exercised at the o¤-equilibrium
histories. The following simple extension of incentive compatibility resolves the
17Interim individual rationality requires that participation be weakly protable before the
output has been realized. Ex post constraint has been analysed e.g. by Forges (1993, 1998) and
Gresik (1991, 1996).
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problem by allowing i to veto the outcome even after his untruthful announce-
ments.18
Denition 1 (VETO-IC) Given p; a mechanism g  h 2  is veto-incentive
compatible ifP
 i
P
s
p () [ui(g(s); i)h (s : ) maxfui(g(s); i); 0gh (s :  i; 0i)]  0; (1)
for all i; 
0
i 2 i; for all i 2 N:
Veto-incentive compatibility requires that truthful reporting forms a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium even if vetoing is possible after an untruthful announcement.
Any implementable mechanism must thus be veto-incentive compatible. For any
p; denote the set of veto-incentive compatible mechanisms by
V IC[p]  :
It is easy to see that any veto-incentive compatible mechanism is incentive com-
patible and ex post individually rational (but not vice versa).19
Truthful announcements form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a veto-incentive
compatible mechanism  = g  h if the seller can commit to following g after h
has performed its information processing task, i.e., produced its signal s. Thus
a mechanism maximizing the sellers payo¤ subject to veto-incentive compatibil-
ity could be interpreted as the sellers full commitment benchmark. Since veto-
incentive compatibility concerns only the payo¤s, any signal structure - even one
that fully reveals the buyerstypes - is consistent with veto-incentive compatibil-
ity. However, while signals do not a¤ect anyones payo¤ directly, they may do so
indirectly, via the sellers behavior at the ex post stage.
Sellers incentives The sellers expected payo¤ from the mechanism  =
g  h is
V (; p) =
P

P
s
p()v(g(s))h (g(s) : ) :
She wants to maximize her expected payo¤ subject to the constraint of not re-
designing the mechanism after observing the signal s from the information process-
ing device h. That is, of replacing the outcome g(s) with another mechanism in
 that generates her a higher expected payo¤ than g(s). Our task is to identify
the conditions under which she will not do that.
Let the sellers (pure) mechanism design strategy be captured by a choice rule
 that species, for each prior belief p; the sellers choice of the mechanism under
these beliefs. Since it is without loss of generality to focus on mechanisms that
the buyers can commit to, the choice rule is assumed to satisfy
 : ()!  such that [p] 2 V IC[p]; for all p: (2)
18Veto-incentive compatibility is due to Forges (1998), and is closely related to IC* of Matthews
and Postlewaite (1989).
19Choose i = 
0
i in (1). We only need EXP-IR and IC in the remainder of the paper.
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Then [p] represents the mechanism that the seller implements under p: Rule 
in turn represents the dynamic mechanism selection strategy of the seller.
We now identify properties that the choice rule  should satisfy. We argue that
the sequential rationality of the seller, and the buyersknowledge of this, requires
that  reect internal consistency and optimization. For these conditions, we need
to develop some concepts. We say that a mechanism g  h 2  is (weakly) ex post
dominated by a mechanism  2  if there is a signal s 2 h(supp(p)) such that
V (; p(s; h))  v(g(s)) and  6= 1g(s) under p(s; h):
That is, the seller weakly prefers  over the recommended outcome g(s), given the
ex post beliefs due to signal s. In such a case, the original mechanism gh may be
subject to redesign. It is easy to see that for a typical p there is no veto-incentive
compatible mechanism that is not ex post dominated.20 Thus the seller is typically
(weakly) tempted to redesign the mechanism.
Now we dene the set of mechanisms that the seller can commit to today
given that  is followed in the future. Under prior p; denote by C[p] the set
of mechanisms that are not subject to redesign under the hypothesis that  is
followed ex post:
C[p] = fg  h 2 V IC[p] : g  h is not ex post dominated by [p(s; h)]; for any s 2 h(supp(p))g :
(3)
Hence, by the revelation principle, and under the hypothesis that the seller can
commit to the choice rule  :
 A mechanism  is truthfully playable if  2 C[p]; since then it will not be
redesigned ex post.
 A mechanism  is not truthfully playable if  62 C[p]; since then it will be
redesigned ex post.
Choice set C[p] is dened with respect to the assumed rule :We now formally
specify conditions that sequential rationality imposes on the choice rule  itself.
The rst condition requires consistency in the sense that employing  ex ante
should not contradict  being employed ex post.
Denition 2 (Consistency) Choice rule  is consistent if [p] 2 C[p]; for all
p:
The second condition implies optimality. Given  and p; the seller should
choose a mechanism that maximizes her payo¤ in the set C[p]:
Denition 3 (One-Deviation Property) Choice rule  satises the one-deviation
property if V ([p]; p)  V (; p); for all  2 C[p]; for all p:
20If 0 2supp(pi) for all i; then a veto-incentive compatible mechanism is not ex post dominated
only if extracts all surplus from the buyers. But full surplus extraction á la Cremes and McLean
(1984) is not possible under veto-incentive compatibility.
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Under the hypothesis that  can be committed to in the future, the seller
does not want to change  under any current prior p: Without the one-deviation
property,  could not be convincingly committed to.
Note how consistency, the one-deviation property, and ex post dominance play
di¤erent roles in the solution. The one-deviation property together with consis-
tency reects optimization: [p] maximizes the sellers payo¤ in C[p]: Ex post
dominance in turn guarantees that this act of optimization is consistent with far-
sightedness. That is, since  is obeyed in the future, not being ex post dominated
with respect to [] guarantees that a mechanism can be committed to. Indeed
the only role of ex post dominance is to test whether the seller can commit to a
particular mechanism under the hypothesis that  is followed in the future. In
particular, the one-deviation property is not implied by ex post dominance.
Now we state two straightforward but important implications of consistency
and the one-deviation property. First, the seller always implements the outcome
of a mechanism that she can commit to.
Lemma 1 Let  be consistent and satisfy the one-deviation property. Then gh 2
C[p] implies that [p(s; h)] = 1g(s); for all s 2 h(supp(p)):
Proof. Take any s 2 h(supp(p)): By consistency, g  h is not ex post domi-
nated by [p(s; h)] under p: By the denition of ex post dominance, 1g(s) is not
ex post dominated by [p(s; h)]: Hence either v(g(s)) > V ([p(s; h)]; p(s; h)) or
v(g(s)) = V ([p(s; h)]; p(s; h)) and [p(s; h)] = 1g(s): By the one-deviation prop-
erty, V ([p(s; h)]; p(s; h))  v(g(s)): Hence it must be the case that [p(s; h)] =
1g(s).
In particular, the choice rule  is idempotent in the following sense: if [p] =
gh; then [p(s; h)] = 1g(s); for all s 2 h(supp(p)): That is, running  twice rather
than once will not a¤ect the outcome.
Second, if the seller can commit to implementing an outcome, then that out-
come must maximize her payo¤ in the class of individually rational outcomes.
Lemma 2 Let  satisfy the one-deviation property. Then [p] = 1x implies that
v(x)  v(y); for all 1y 2 V IC[p]:
We now check that our solution is consistent with the standard bargaining
theory.
The Coase conjecture The Coase conjecture, which pertains to our n = 1
case, argues that when the seller is unable to commit not to sell the good, the
buyer is able to extract all the surplus. That is, the outcome of the one-sided
bargaining game is to sell the good with price (p), the minimal possible valuation
 in the support of p: The Coase conjecture has been extensively studied in the
non-cooperative bargaining literature, and veried in the so called "gap" case
(p) > 0 e.g. by Fudenberg et al. (1985) and Gul et al. (1986).
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The next proposition shows that the result can be derived also in our set up,
without going into the details of the bargaining process. Thus consistency and the
one-deviation property do capture the key aspects of sequential rationality.
Remark 1 (Gap-case) Let n = 1: Let  be a consistent choice function meeting
the one-deviation restriction. Then [p] = 1(1;(p)); for all p such that (p) > 0:
That is, any [p] sells the good to the buyer with the price equal to his min-
imal possible valuation. To see this, note that by Lemma 1, [p(s; h)] = 1g(s);
for all s 2 h(supp(p)): By Lemma 2, g(s) maximizes v in the class of constant,
individually rational mechanisms under p(s; h). Since (p(s; h)) > 0 we have
g(s) = (1; (p(s; h))): But by imitating  = (p) > 0; any 0 2supp(p) can guar-
antee to be able to buy the good at price (p). Hence by incentive compatibility,
g(h()) = (1; (p)); for all  2supp(p):
However, it is also well known that in the "no gap" case, (p) = 0; other more
complex equilibria can be constructed (see e.g. Ausubel and Deneckere, 1989). To
avoid them, the literature often focuses on simple "stationary" equilibria (see e.g.
Ausubel et al., 2001).
The problem with multiplicity of (complex) solutions also applies in our case
when (p) = 0. It can be shown that for any  2  there is a choice rule
 that is consistent and meets the one-deviation property, and sells to types
   and never to types  <  of the buyer given the prior p. However, all
constructed  are complex, and require the seller to condition  on seemingly
supercial information. To remove these complexities, our nal restriction imposes
a degree of simplicity on choice rules. It demands that the implemented outcome is
not conditioned on information that does not provide more protable transaction
opportunities.
Denition 4 (Stationarity) A choice rule  is stationary if [p] = 1x; [p0] =
1x0 ; v(x)  v(x0); and supp(p0)  supp(p) imply x = x0.
That is, signals that do not allow the seller to implement a more protable
choice do not a¤ect the sellers choice. For example, the choice rule  above
fails stationarity (see Appendix B for the precise exposition).21 The next section
characterizes the inducible stationary choice rules in the general n  1 case.
4 Results
4.1 Overview
Before formally establishing the results, we give a heuristic account of them. Our
main result is that the English auction (or its version) is the only mechanism
that the seller can credibly commit to. The core of our argument is simple. The
outcome of the English auction reveals exactly the information that is needed for
21For an analogous restriction, see Ausubel and Deneckere (2001).
12
the seller to credibly implement this outcome. The reason for this is that the
outcome of the English auction separates the possible valuations of the winner
from those of the other buyers, and hence the seller cannot commit to not selling
to the winner with the proposed price - his least possible valuation given the ex
post information. We show that only the English auction has this property.
More specically, we rst demonstrate that the choice rule where the seller
always uses the English auction - or the version which uses all the information
contained in the non-winnersvaluations to compute the lower bound of the win-
ners valuation - is consistent. This follows from the fact that running the English
auction twice rather than once does not a¤ect the outcome. To prove that the
English auction -choice rule also satises the one-deviation property, we show that
if a mechanism cannot be protably changed by employing the English auction ex
post, then the mechanism must, in fact, be outcome equivalent with the English
auction itself. This "xed point" result is obtained via induction on the value
spaces of the buyers, and implies that the English auction -choice rule cannot be
changed protably with a one-time deviation.
To prove that the English auction -choice rule is the only feasible one, we rst
argue that any sellers choice rule that is stationary and consistent cannot reject
(all the versions of) the English auction. This is true since any realization of
an English auction reveals the winner and his least possible valuation given the
other buyersvaluations. Thus any mechanism that ex post dominates the English
auction must threaten the winner to sell the good to the buyer with the second
highest valuation, to force the winner to pay a higher price. However, this threat
is not credible since when the winner declines the o¤er, the seller cannot commit
to not sell - as suggested by the Coase conjecture - to the winner with his least
possible valuation. Finally, since some English auction is always feasible, it follows
that the mechanism chosen by the seller must be robust against being upset by
the English auction ex post. This strong restriction implies, by the xed point
argument made in the previous paragraph, that any choice rule must be outcome
equivalent with the English auction -choice rule.
Two modeling aspects complicate the analysis. First, we do not put any restric-
tions, e.g. in terms of independence, on the distributions of the buyersvaluations.
Doing otherwise would require us to impose unnatural constraints on the employed
mechanisms since the posterior distributions should also satisfy the restrictions. To
cope with general distributions, the English auction has to be modied to take into
account all the information hidden in the non-winnersvaluations which makes the
formal denition of the mechanism somewhat more involved than usually. Second,
since we cannot assume away the positive probability of an event where at least
two buyers have same highest valuation or the highest valuation equals the sellers
valuation, the English auction has to be appended with a tie-breaking rule. By
consistency, the same tie-breaking rule has to be applied uniformly to the whole
English auction -choice rule. Di¤erent tie-breaking rules then give rise to di¤erent
English auction -choice rules.
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4.2 The analysis
The English auction E A tie-breaking rule w : ! N[f0g always selects
one of the players with the highest valuation
w() 2 arg max
j2N[f0g
j; for all  2 : (4)
Note that w() = 0 means that the seller keeps the good when i = 0 for all
i 2 N . The buyer w() is called "the winner" under the type prole , and the set
w 1(i)   consists of the type proles under which w chooses i as the winner.
Our mechanism is indexed by the tie-breaking rule.
Given a prior distribution p and a tie-breaking rule w; we now construct a
deterministic mechanism E () = gE  hE() ; the English auction:22 Dene a set
of public signals SE by
SE = f(w();  w()) :  2 g;
and a deterministic information processing device hE : ! SE such that
hE() = (w();  w()); for all  2 :
In words, under type prole  the information processing device of the English
auction produces the signal hE() = (w();  w()); which makes public the identity
of the winner w() and all the nonwinnerstypes  w():
The implementation device gE is dened on SE: The English auction allocates
the good to the winner with the price equal to the least possible valuation of the
winner above the second highest valuation. Formally, the winners money transfer
rule is as follows: for any i 2 N;
mE(i;  i; p) = minf0i : (0i;  i) 2 w 1(i) \ supp(p)g; if  2 w 1(i): (5)
That is, mE(i;  i; p) is the least possible valuation of i given the information that
(i) i is the winner, (ii) the other buyerstypes are  i: The implementation device
gE : SE ! X is now dened, for each buyer j 2 N , for all (i;  i) 2 SE, by
gEj (i;  i) =

(1;mE(i;  i; p)); if j = i;
(0; 0); if j 6= i: (6)
That is, E() = gE(hE()) allocates the good to the winner i = w() who pays
a price equal to his least possible valuation (i) given the other buyerstypes, (ii)
the fact that i is the winner, and (iii) p.23 The corresponding payo¤s are, for all
i 2 N;
ui
 
E(); i

=

i  mE(i;  i; p); if  2 w 1(i) \ supp(p);
0; if  62 w 1(i) \ supp(p):
22We relax w from the description of the English auction E for notational simplicity.
23Note that E(p) reveals only the winners identity and the other playersvaluations. Hence
it cannot be interpreted as the Vickrey (second-price) auction which asks all buyers to reveal
their valuations.
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By construction, E is e¢ cient and the price paid by the winner is less than
or equal to his valuation, and at least as high as the other buyersvaluations.24
Moreover, since the winner i becomes publicly known along with the signal s =
(i;  i), the posterior belief p((i;  i); hE) satises
supp(p((i;  i); hE))  w 1(i): (7)
Since the implementation device is a bijection, we may denote the posterior
p(s; hE) simply by p(x; E).
Mechanism E has the familiar pivotal structure: a buyers payment - and
hence his payo¤ - is independent of his announcement as long as he wins (or
loses). The impact of lying on his payo¤ cannot be positive since it either induces
the buyer to win when he would like to lose, or to lose when he would like to win,
given the other buyersvaluations. Since truthtelling is a dominant strategy,
E 2 V IC[p]:
Feasible choice rules To highlight the fact that in the above denition the
English auction is conditioned on the prior p; let us denote it by E[p]: Keeping
xed the tie-breaking rule for which the English auction is dened, the function
E : () !  can now be taken as the English auction -choice rule. Di¤erent
tie-breaking rules then yield di¤erent English auction -choice rules. Construct a
correspondence C
E  V IC such that
C
E
[p] =

 2 V IC[p] :  is not ex post dominated by E[p0]; for any p0 2 ()	 :
Our aim is to prove that the English auction choice rule is essentially the only
rule that can be committed to (up to a tie-breaking rule). The argument is made
in two parts, the rst demonstating su¢ ciency and the second necessity. The
result is stated in Theorem 1.
We rst prove the su¢ ciency - that the English auction -choice rule is consistent
and satises the one-deviation property. This is done via two lemmas. First, note
that the English auction -choice rule, being dened with respect to a xed tie-
breaking rule, is idempotent: E[p(x; E[p])] = 1x; for all x 2 E[p](supp(p)); for
all p: That is, after running the English auction, a new English auction does not
change the outcome. This implies that the English auction E[p] is not ex post
dominated by E[p(x; E[p])]: Hence it follows that E[p] 2 CE [p] for all p. More
compactly: the English auction -choice rule is consistent.
Lemma 3 (Consistency) E[] is consistent.
We now argue that the English auction -choice rule satises the one-deviation
property. To do this, we establish a very strong result: any mechanism in C
E
[p]
is outcome equivalent - and hence payo¤ equivalent - with the English auction
E[p]: This guarantees that there is no protable single stage deviation to the
sellers mechanism design strategy. The result is also used in the proof of the
uniqueness of the feasible sellers strategy.
24When the valuations are correlated, there may be a gap between this and the second highest
valuation
15
Lemma 4 (One-deviation property)  2 CE [p] only if  is outcome equiva-
lent to E[p]; for all p.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.
That is, given p; the only veto-incentive compatible mechanisms that are not ex
post dominated by any E[p0] are the mechanism E[p] itself and its versions that
may additionally reveal some non-relevant information concerning the winners
type: Thus E has a "xed point" property. The proof relies on induction on the
buyerstype sets.
We now demonstrate that there is no other rule than the English auction
choice rule that meets the desiderata. The argument is made in two stages, the
rst demonstrating that any stationary rule  that is consistent and meets the one-
deviation property induces C that contains E, specied for some tie-breaking
rule w: The second part uses this nding to show that C is contained in C
E
:
Together with Lemma 4, this proves that E is outcome equivalent to any feasible
mechanism.
Heuristically, if  ex post dominates E[p], then  must change E[p]s allo-
cation. Since any outcome x of E[p] reveals the winner and his least possible
valuation given the other buyersvaluations,  must threaten the winner to sell
the good to the buyer with the second highest valuation to force the winner to pay
a higher price. However, this threat is not credible since when the winner declines
the o¤er, the seller sells - by stationarity and Lemma 2 - to the winner with his
least possible valuation.
Lemma 5 (Uniqueness I) Let a choice rule  be stationary, consistent, and
satisfy the one-deviation property. Then there is a tie-breaking rule w such that
E[p] 2 C[p]; for all p:
Proof. Construct w as follows: For any  2 ; denote by 1 the degenerate
prior such that supp(1) = fg: Then there is an outcome x such that [1] = 1x :
Let w() = i if x allocates the good to i: By Lemma 2, such w() satises (4).
Use this w to construct E:
Suppose, on the contrary of the claim, that there is p such that E[p] 62 C[p].
Then E[p] is ex post dominated by [p(x; E[p])] for some x 2 E[p](supp(p)):
Denote [p(x; E[p])] = g  h:
Let x allocate the good to player i: By stationarity, since gh ex post dominates
1x; g  h cannot be a constant mechanism. By IC there are 0 2supp(p(x; E[p])),
s 2 h(0); and j 6= i such that 0i = 0j; and such that g(s) allocates the good to j:
By Lemma 1, 1g(s) = [p(x; 
E[p])(s; h)]: Since
1x 2 V IC[p(x; E[p])]  V IC[p(x; E[p])(s; h))];
it follows by Lemma 2 that v(g(s))  v(x):
By (7), supp(p(x; E[p]))  Yi and, by the denition of support,
supp(p(x; E[p])(s; h))  supp(p(x; E[p])):
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Thus, by the construction of w; EXP-IR, and Lemma 1, [10 ] = 1x:However, since
g(s) 2 h(0); also supp(10) supp(p(x; E[p])(s; h)): This implies, by stationarity,
that g(s) = x; violating the assertion that x allocates the good to i and g(s) to
j 6= i:
We now use the previous lemma to prove that if a stationary  is consistent
and meets the one-deviation property relative to C; then there is a tie-breaking
rule w such that no element of C[p] is ex post dominated by E[q] for any q:
Lemma 6 (Uniqueness II) Let a choice rule  be stationary, consistent, and
satisfy the one-deviation property. Then C[p]  CE [p]; for all p; for some tie-
breaking rule w:
Proof. Let g h 2 C[p] and s 2 h(supp(p)): Denote x = g(s) and q = p(s; h):
By Lemma 1, [q] = 1x: Identify w as in Lemma 5. It su¢ ces for us to show
that 1x is not ex post dominated by 
E[q]: Suppose, on the contrary, that it
is. By Lemma 5, E[q] 2 C[q]: By the denition of one-deviation property,
V ([q]; q)  V (E[q]; q): Thus v(x)  V (E[q]; q):
Take any y 2 E[q](supp(q)). Then supp(q(y; E[q])) supp(q) and, hence,
x 2 fx0 : 1x0 2 V IC[q]g  fx0 : 1x0 2 V IC[q(y; E[p])]g:
Since, by Lemma 1, [q(y; E[q])] = 1y and 1x 2 V IC[q(y; E[q])]; it follows
by Lemma 2 that v(x)  v(y): Since y was arbitrary, and v(x)  v(E[q]; q);
the inequality must hold as equality. But then, since supp(q(y; E[q])) supp(p);
stationarity implies that x = y: Thus E[q] = 1x; which contradicts the hypothesis
that E[q] ex post dominates 1x:
By Lemma 6, a stationary and consistent  that meets the one-deviation prop-
erty is not ex post dominated by an English auction. Hence [p] cannot allocate
the good to anyone but the buyer with the highest valuation, i.e., [p] must be
e¢ cient. An implication of the lemma is that the commitment inability of the
seller leads to an e¢ cient allocation, as suggested by the Coase theorem.
Since [p] is e¢ cient, and the lowest type of a buyer earns zero payo¤, the
revenue equivalence theorem implies that E[p] is the (generically) unique im-
plementable mechanism if the buyersvaluations are independent. However, we
can say more: by Lemma 4, if the seller is unable to commit, the uniqueness of
the implementable mechanisms is a general phenomenon and holds for any prior
distribution.
For an illustrative example, let N = f1; 2g and  =supp(p) = f5; 10g2: Let,
say, w(10; 10) = w(10; 5) = w(5; 5) = 1 and w(5; 10) = 2: Take  2 C[p]: Since
1x is not ex post dominated by 
E[p(x; )] for any x 2 (supp(p)), () allocates
the good to buyer 1 under all  2 f(5; 5); (10; 5); (10; 10)g: Transfers from 1 under
 = (5; 5) and  = (10; 10) are 5 and 10; respectively: By incentive compatibility,
transfer from 1 under (10; 5) is 5. Since only (5; 10) allocates the the good to
2, 2s type 2 = 10 is then revealed. Hence, his transfer must be 10; which means
that  = E[p] under p.
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Now we are ready to state our main result. Since E[] is well dened (by (4),
(5), and (6)), the rst part of the theorem also proves the existence of a solution.
Theorem 1 1.Choice rule E is stationary, consistent and satises the one-deviation
property, for any tie-breaking rule w.
2. If a choice rule  is stationary, consistent, and satises the one-deviation
property, then there is a tie-breaking rule w such that [p] is outcome equivalent
to E[p]; for all p:
Proof. 1. Stationary of E follows from the existence of a tie-breaking rule w
for which E is constructed. Lemma 3 establishes consistency. The one-deviation
property follows from Lemma 4: any  2 CE [p] agrees with E[p] on X and,
hence, induces the same payo¤ as E[p].
2. Let stationary rule  be consistent and satisfy the one-deviation property.
By Lemma 5, there is w and C such that E 2 C: By Lemma 6, C  CE : By
construction,  2 C: Thus, by Lemma 4, [p] is outcome equivalent to E[p]; for
all p:
That is, the seller can commit to the English auction provided that she does
so consistently, under all distributions of the buyersvaluations. Moreover, the
payo¤ structure of every feasible auction coincides with that of the English auc-
tion (dened for some tie breaking rule w). The only di¤erence of a committable
mechanism and the English auction may concern additional, payo¤ irrelevant in-
formation on the players valuations.25
We should stress that the rst result requires that the tie-breaking rule is well
dened, and the second that the stationarity condition is satised by the choice
rule. While the former assumption is innocent, and a consequence of appropriate
modeling, the second one is more substantial. The key justication for stationarity
is simplicity. A construction along the lines of Ausubel and Deneckere (1989)
would presumably allow the seller to commit to a choice rule that is more complex
than the English auction -choice rule.
The generalized Coase conjecture With the stationarity assumption the
Coase conjecture can now also be veried in the "no gap" case. By the second
part of Theorem 1, if  is stationary, consistent, and meets the one-deviation
property, then [p] = E[p] which allocates the good to any buyer  > 0 with
price minw 1(1)\supp(p) 26
To conclude, our argument can be seen as a generalization of the Coase conjec-
ture which, in the current set up can be formulated as follows: E[p] is the unique
feasible mechanism in the n = 1 case when the seller cannot commit to not sell to
25It is interesting that while full surplus extraction is feasible under full commitment under
almost all p (Crémer and McLean, 1988; McAfee and Reny, 1991), only the English auction is
feasible without commitment.
26If supp(p) > 0, then this number is equal to supp(p): If supp(p) = 0; then it is 0 if the
tie-breaking rule allocates the good to the buyer at  = 0; and minf > 0 :  2supp(p)g if it
allocates the good to the seller at  = 0:
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the buyer who values the good more than she does. Our more general version of
the claim says that in the E[p] is the unique feasible mechanism in the n  1 case
when the seller cannot commit to not selling to the buyer who values the good
more than the buyer with the second highest valuation. More succinctly: Without
external commitment devices, the seller can only commit to the English auction.
5 Discussion of the solution concept
It is important to understand in what sense our key desiderata - the one-deviation
property and consistency - reect sequential rationality. Suppose that the seller
does make a single deviation to her mechanism design strategy : Then under
p she chooses another incentive feasible mechanism, say ; rather than [p]; and
returns to follow  once  has been processed and beliefs have been a¤ected
accordingly. We argue that the deviation cannot possibly be protable for the
seller. On the one hand, if following  is consistent with the implementation of ;
then, by the one-deviation property and consistency of ;  could not have been
a protable deviation to [p] in the rst place: On the other hand, if following
 is not consistent with the implementation of ; then  will be redesigned ex
post according to  and, since the deviation was of one-shot nature, the new
mechanism is implemented as planned. But by the standard revelation argument,
the combination of  and its redesign can now be interpreted as a single incentive
feasible mechanism that cannot be, by the one-deviation property and consistency
of ; a protable deviation to [p]: This argument obviously generalizes to all
nitely long deviations to the mechanism design strategy. Hence the one-deviation
property and consistency of  reect sequential rationality of the players in the
sense that no nite sequence of deviations to  can be protable for the seller.
If also innitely long deviations are permitted, then an assumption has to be
made concerning the payo¤s from innite streams of redesigns. There are natural
assumptions that guarantee that the results of this paper still hold. Construct an
explicit extensive form game in which the seller, at each round, designs an incentive
feasible mechanism and then chooses whether to implement the outcome of the
mechanism played by the bidders, or whether to design another incentive feasible
mechanism to extract further information from the bidders. Also each innite
terminal history is now associated a payo¤: We conjecture that if the payo¤s
are zero when the outcome is never implemented and the future is undiscounted,
then the one-deviation property and consistency characterize the perfect Bayesian
equilibria of the game as in this paper. If, however, the future is discounted or
there are other redesign costs, then the equilibria of the game need not correspond
to our equilibria (see Skreta, 2010). Whether the equilibria do coincide in the limit,
when the redesign costs tend to zero, remains an open question.
One may wonder whether the ex post domination criterion in the denition
of the one-deviation property, which is dened by a weak payo¤ dominance, is
needlessly strong. A natural weaker candidate would be to demand strict payo¤
dominance. Strict domination is, however, in conict with our basic assumption
that the sellers mechanism selection rule is dependent only on the prior p: To see
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this, consider the n = 2 case and supp(p) = f0g  f0; 1g: With the tie-breaking
rule w that allocates the good under  = (0; 0) to buyer 2; mechanism E[p] would
always sell to buyer 2 with price 0: With strict domination criterion, a procedure
that sells to 1 under  = (0; 0) with price 0 and to 2 under  = (0; 1) with price 1
would be not be strictly ex post dominated. And selling to 1 under  = (0; 0) with
price 0 would be in conict with E[q] where prior q is degenerate on  = (0; 0):
Combining strict dominance with sequential rationality would therefore require
history dependent choices, and the mechanism selection rule  would no longer be
denable as a function of p.
6 Conclusion
Mechanism design requires commitment since at the ex post stage, when the mech-
anism has produced the information needed for implementing the output, the
seller may want to change the rules of the game and design a new mechanism.
Mechanisms are particularly vulnerable to commitment problems in anonymous
platforms like the Internet.
We have studied auction mechanisms that the seller can credibly implement
without external commitment devices. To this end, we have developed a new
reduced form modeling approach. We recognize that a mechanism does two things:
processes information and implements an outcome. We separate these tasks, and
relate the latter as the source of the sellers commitment problem. If the seller
cannot commit to implementing the outcome once the mechanism has been run,
she has an incentive to extract further surplus from the buyers by initiating a new
mechanism under the ex post beliefs. Of course, the new mechanism is subject
to the same commitment problem, and so on. The objective of the paper is
to identify the conditions under which the seller will be able to commit to the
mechanism given the consequences of doing or not doing so. This requires that
the sellers mechanism design strategy has to be dened for all distributions. The
two conditions we impose on the sellers mechanism design strategy, which reect
her sequential rationality, are internal consistency and optimization. We show
that the only mechanism that satises these restrictions as well as a stationarity
condition is the traditional English auction (or its version).
At the heart of the analysis is the argument that a sequentially rational seller
can always commit to the English auction. This idea can be seen as a general-
ization of the Coase conjecture (e.g. Fudenberg et al., 1985; Gul et al., 1986). In
the one buyer case, the claim states that the seller can only commit to sell the
good to the buyer with a price equal to his least possible valuation. In the multi-
ple buyers case, the seller can always commit to the English auction since, when
the mechanism reveals the buyer with the highest valuation and his least possible
valuation (= the second highest valuation), the seller cannot commit to raising
the price above this lower bound. Importantly, because the seller can credibly
commit to the English auction, she cannot commit to mechanisms that are ex
post dominated by the English auction. Our main result is that this constraint is
20
very severe: only the English auction itself satises it.27
Our model provides support for the English auction in the general class of
auction mechanisms. Many studies have demonstrated the usefulness of the Eng-
lish auction in a restricted class of mechanisms. In a classic treatise, Milgrom and
Weber (1982) show that the English auction is optimal among the four standard
auction forms when the valuations are a¢ liated, a natural assumption in many
auction scenarios.28 In the same model, Lopomo (1998, 2001) demonstrates that
the English auction features robustness in a sense that it is optimal among simple
sequential auctions and in a class of posteriorly implementable auctions (a concept
due to Green and La¤ont, 1987).
Posterior implementability requires that the buyersbehavior is regret-free in
the sense that they would not want to change their behavior even if they knew the
outcome of the mechanism. This property is at the heart of the robustness of the
English auction and the Vickrey auction.29 It also partly drives our results. Due to
posterior implementability, running the English or the Vickrey auction twice in a
row rather than just once will not a¤ect the outcome. But this is only a necessary
condition of a feasible auction. On the su¢ cient side, one needs to guarantee that
the seller cannot commit to anymore protable auction at the ex post stage, given
the information that is generated by the mechanism. For example, the Vickrey
auction, which is posteriorly implementable, is not implementable when the seller
cannot commit since it reveals too much information.
Finally, our model provides some insights into the literature on optimal auc-
tions under e¢ ciency (e.g. Ausubel and Cramton 1999; Krishna and Perry, 1998).
The e¢ ciency restriction is usually motivated vaguely by appealing to Coasian
dynamics, which leads to the e¢ cient allocation of resources through the sellers
inability to commit, or resale markets.30 This paper is explicit on how e¢ ciency
emerges as a consequence of sequentially rational redesigns of auction mechanisms.
27Milgrom (1987) argues that the core implements the e¢ cient allocation under complete
information.
28Including the English, Vickrey, Dutch, and rst-price auctions. However, Matthews (1987)
and Maskin and Riley (1984) show that risk-aversion reverses the ranking.
29The English auction also satises a stronger condition of ex post implementability : that one
does not want to change ones own behavior even if one knows the behavior of the other players.
See e.g. Bergeman and Morris (2005, 2008).
30Zheng (2002) is an exception. He characterizes outcome functions that can be implemented
with explicit resale markets. See also Haile (2000) for a formal modelling of retrading.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
First assume that  = g  h is deterministic, i.e., () = g(h()) is singleton
for all . We show that g(h()) = E[p](), for all  2 : Denote, for notational
simplicity, Yi = f 2  : w() = ig for all i:
Since  = g  h is not ex post dominated by E[p(s; h)]; g(h()) has to al-
locate the good to the same buyer as E[p(s; h)] () does, for all s 2 h(); for
all  2supp(p). Since E satises Lemma 1, () = g(h()) allocates the good
to the same buyer as E[p]() does for, all  2supp(p). Thus the partition fYig
species the winner under : Since, by EXP-IR, a non-winner cannot be imposed
a strictly positive monetary transfer, the allocation of g(h()) may di¤er from
E[p] () only in terms of the winners monetary transfer. Denote the winners
monetary transfer under g(h()) by mi(). Thus, our task reduces to showing
that mi() = mE(i;  i; p); for all  2 Yi; for all i.
Fix i: Since i is discrete and bounded below, we can order its elements by
0i < ::: < 
k
i < ::: : We prove by induction that mi(
k
i ;  i) = m
E(i;  i; p); for
all  i such that (
k
i ;  i) 2 Yi; for all k = 0; 1; ::: : Assume that the induction
hypothesis holds until the step k   1; i.e.,
mi(
l
i;  i) = m
E(i;  i; p); for all (
l
i;  i) 2 Yi \ supp(p); for all l = 0; :::; k   1:
(8)
We show that (8) holds also for step k:
Take any s 2 h(supp(p)): Since  does not leave surplus to the winner that
could be extracted by E(p((x; s); ));
mi(
k
i ;  i)  mE(i;  i; p(s; h)); for all (ki ;  i) 2 supp(p(s; h)):
Since supp(p(s; h)) supp(p);
mE(i;  i; p(s; h))  mE(i;  i; p); for all (ki ;  i) 2 supp(p(s; h)): (9)
Noting that (9) holds for all s 2 h(supp(p)); it follows from the above two condi-
tions that
mi(
k
i ;  i)  mE(i;  i; p); for all (ki ;  i) 2 supp(p): (10)
It remains to be shown that the weak inequality in (10) holds as equality.
By (5),
mE(i;  i; p) = 
k
i for all (
k
i ;  i) 2 Yi \ supp(p) such that (k 1i ;  i) 62 Yi: (11)
This has two implications. First,P
(ki ; i;)2Yi
[k  mE(i;  i; p)]p(ki ;  i) =
P
(k 1i ; i)2Yi
[k  mE(i;  i; p)]p(ki ;  i):
(12)
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Second, by (10), mi( i; 
k
i )  ki for all mi(p;  i) = ki for all
 
ki ;  i
 2
Yi\supp(p) such that
 
k 1i ;  i
 62 Yi: By VETO-IC and this property,P
(ki ; i)2Yi
[ki  mi(ki ;  i)]p(ki ;  i) (13)
 P
(ki ; i)2Yi
maxfki  mi(k 1i ;  i); 0gp(ki ;  i)
=
P
(k 1i ; i)2Yi
maxfki  mi(k 1i ;  i); 0gp(ki ;  i):
By the induction hypothesis (8),
ki  mi(k 1i ;  i) = ki  mE(i;  i; p); for all (k 1i ;  i) 2 Yi \ supp(p): (14)
By (14) and (11), P
(k 1i ; i)2Yi\supp(p)
maxfki  mi(k 1i ;  i); 0gp(ki ;  i)
=
P
(k 1i ; i)2Yi\supp(p)
[ki  mE(i;  i; p)]p(ki ;  i)
=
P
(k 1i ; i)2Yi
[ki  mE(i;  i; p)]p(ki ;  i):
Thus, P
(k 1i ; i)2Yi
maxfki  mi(k 1i ;  i); 0gp(ki ;  i)
 P
(k 1i ; i)2Yi
[ki  mE(p;  i)]p(ki ;  i):
This together with (13) imply thatP
(ki ; i)2Yi
[ki  mi(ki ;  i)]p(ki ;  i) 
P
(k 1i ; i)2Yi
[ki  mE(i;  i; p)]p(ki ;  i):
Thus, by (12),P
(ki ; i)2Yi
[ki  mi(ki ;  i)]p(ki ;  i) 
P
(ki ; i)2Yi
[ki  mE(i;  i; p)]p(ki ;  i);
and hence P
(ki ; i)2Yi
mi(
k
i ;  i)p(
k
i ;  i) 
P
(ki ; i)2Yi
mE(i;  i; p)p(
k
i ;  i): (15)
Finally, (15) implies that (10) holds as equality, as desired.
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Finally we check the case of random h. Note that even if gh is random, it has
to allocate the good to the same buyer as E[p] does. Thus randomness of g  h
may only concern the monetary transfer m. The proof, which is by induction,
proceeds along the above lines. It is easy to verify that (10) holds also for any
randomly generated monetary transferm under
 
ki ;  i

:Moreover, (15) needs to
hold for the expected transfer m under
 
ki ;  i

: Again, this just means that (10)
holds as equality for each m; thus mE(i;  i; p) is implemented with probability
one under all
 
ki ;  i
 2supp(p): This completes the proof.
B Appendix
Non-stationarity of 
Let n = 1 and assume the "no gap" -case 0 2  6= f0g:We construct a sellers
choice function  that allows the seller to commit to any price  2 : Dene a
take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
() =

(1; ); if   ;
(0; 0); if  < :
That is, "sell with price  to any type  at least  and not sell to type below ":
Dene choice rule  such that
[p] =

; if f0; g  supp(p);
1(1;(p)); otherwise:
That is, if both 0 and  belong to the support of p; then use : Otherwise sell
with the price equal to the least possible valuation in supp(p):
We claim that  satises the one-deviation property.
(i) If f0; g supp(p); then f(1; ); (0; 0)g = [p]. Now:
- 0 <  = (p((1; ); [p])) and thus [p((1; ); [p])] = 1(1;); and
- 0 = (p((0; 0); [p])) and thus [p((0; 0); [p])] = 1(0;0).
(ii) If f0; g 6supp(p); then (p) = 1(1;(p)) and (p) = 1(0;0); respectively.
Since constant mechanisms do not a¤ect beliefs,  satises the one-deviation
property. Thus, the seller can commit to any price  2supp(p):
We now argue that  does not meet stationarity. To see this, let f0; g supp(p):
Denote by 10 the degenerate distribution such that supp(10) = f0g 63 : Then
supp(10) supp(p). By construction; [p] =  and [10] = 1(1;0). There-
fore, [p](0) = (0; 0) and [10](0) = (1; 0): However, v((1; 0)) = v((0; 0)) = 0;
violating stationarity.
This result is analogous to Ausubel and Deneckere (1989), who show that any
price can be supported in equilibrium in the one sided o¤ers bargaining game
when the discount factor  tends to 1. Strategies needed for these equilibria are
complicated, i.e. non-stationary.
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